Internal political situation will worsen Indo-Pak relations Bharat Shakti 20 Feb 18
The Pak army chief had recently stated in the Pak senate that he is willing to support peace talks with India. However, looking at the future, there is no option for talks even to be proposed by either side, solely due to political instability in Pak and forthcoming elections in both, India and Pakistan.
After the removal on flimsy grounds of Nawaz Sharif, instability in Pak has only increased. The government remains under threat from multiple directions. On one hand is the army, seeking to keep the government under its control, while on the other is a collection of fundamentalist and religious organizations challenging the writ of the government in cohort with opposition parties.
The army had brokered a deal with the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan in Nov last year in which the government was forced to accept all their demands, including the resignation of the federal law minister. Presently is the arrival onto the scene of the Pakistan Awami Tehreek, under the leadership of Tahir ul Qadri, with support from all major opposition parties, seeking to remove the present government from power.
This is the cauldron under which Pakistan goes to elections in the mid of this year, if it does not face army rule before it. Religious, fundamentalist, regional and mainstream political parties would be fighting to gain power. The army would have its own choices to add to the confusion. China would be keeping a hawk’s eye as it has investments to protect. A radical government could be a threat.
Relations with India, increased tensions along the LoC and India baiting would be a major plank for Pak elections. Stability of Afghanistan, fake claims of India sponsoring terror groups from Afghan soil, Kashmir and the supposed freedom struggle there would be played up by all parties. Support to the Kashmiri cause will be a common agenda point from all political parties. Thus, the LoC would remain active, infiltration would continue and anti-India tirade by known India baiters, Hafiz Saeed and his ilk including Sayeed Salahudeen, would increase, as they would seek to win the support of the masses for their proxy candidates (provided they are prevented from forming a political party).
Relations with the US, economic benefits of the CPEC and corruption charges of Nawaz Sharif would be pursued by all political, religious and fundamentalist parties to let the ruling PML (N) down. Religious and fundamentalist parties would promise imposing of the Sharia law. Thus, this would be a stormy year in Pak. No party in this atmosphere could ever profess improving relations with India or reducing tensions in the neighbourhood as one of its agenda points.
This period would benefit the Pak army, which has always been anti-peace talks with India, as it does not suit its strategic design. It would be willing to back any party, political or fundamentalist, which would support its views. Thus, any government which is likely to assume power, single party or coalition would have the tacit backing of the army. Post the removal of Nawaz, all future political leaders would be aware of the consequences of challenging the army’s writ. Therefore, from Pak’s perspective, peace talks with India may not see the light of day for a long time.
By the time Pak elections terminate and a government does take office, as also settle in, it would be time for India to begin gearing up for the 2019 elections. The ruling BJP would project its strong approach to cross border terrorism, surgical strikes, handling terrorism in the valley, basically projecting itself as being the only party to give a fitting response to Pak for its misadventures. It would play the Pak card to full public measure. The opposition, fearing losing out in the elections, would tend to counter the BJP, but would never seek to oppose the BJP and project commencing peace talks with Pak.
Indian elections are due in mid-2019, close to which, there would be attempts by Pak to discredit the present government, by launching terror strikes, hoping to create confusion within the electorate seeking a destabilized India. It would also seek to enhance the tempo in Kashmir to add to the confusion. For Pak, the BJP continuing in power is undesirable as it has given the army the freedom to act. Hence, by increasing its actions along the border and internally, it would hope to bring about a change in the government.
Thus, as Indian elections draw close, India would remain wary, with the government willing to up the ante, solely for political gains. If Pak keeps its actions confined to J and K, the government would react as hither to fore, however, if it does seek to cause turmoil, within the nation, it may be compelled to act. This scenario would have the sub-continent on the boil, with the international community worried about the increasing tensions and the possibility of a nuclear fallout.
Into this quagmire would be relations with China. The Modi-Xi Jinping bonhomie is all but over. Doklam and continued Chinese posturing, India’s refusal to join the BRI and Chinese support to Pak, while blocking India’s entry into the NSG has ensured it. China would prefer a weaker government in Delhi, which could be compelled to join the BRI and also rein in the army from its present hard stance of countering Chinese forays into Indian territory. Thus, China and Pak would seek a weak coalition in power in Delhi rather than a strong government as at present.
Therefore, till late into 2019, there would be an anti-India/Pak atmosphere being created within the masses solely for political gains on both sides of the border. Thus, for the army, it would be added tensions, increased ceasefire violations, multiple attempts at infiltration and fuelling internal strife in the valley. The Chinese front would also witness multiple transgressions and standoffs. While the NSAs may continue to maintain contact, there would be no change in ground conditions. Talks are unlikely to be mentioned for at least two years.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army