Temporary gains likely from new war on terror The Statesman 07 Mar 17
Post terror strikes which killed over a hundred innocents in a week, spread across the country, Pak army announced, with much fanfare, the launch of Operation ‘Rad-ul-Fasaad’, its latest in a series of crackdowns against terror groups across the country. The aim of the operation, as announced by their Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), is ‘indiscriminately eliminating residual and latent threat of terrorism, consolidating gains of operations made thus far and further ensuring security of the borders’. The press release went on to state that it would involve the participation of the military, civilian armed forces and intelligence agencies. Interestingly, it was announced by their army, not the government, as would be the norm in a true democracy.
In Punjab, the operations would be under the control of the Rangers, an organization officered by the army, but for the international community, under the aegis of the ministry of interior (akin to our Assam Rifles). The fear in the country was so palpable that the finals of the Pakistan Cricket League in Lahore, was conducted under a five-tier security with almost curfew like conditions across the city. The markets were forcibly closed, spectators went through a three-tier security check and the army and rangers were deployed across the city.
As a precursor, in Jun 14, post the Taliban attack on Karachi airport, Pak army launched Operation Zarb-e-azb, seeking to eliminate terrorist groups active in North Waziristan. By Sept 16, it claimed to have eliminated over 3500 militants and arrested untold numbers as part of the operation, figures which cannot be independently confirmed. However, the continuing series of terror strikes post the so-claimed successful operations, proved that it only provided temporary relief to the country, as anti-Pak terror outfits re-grouped and launched strikes with greater vigour. This too may turn out to be on similar lines.
The present operation is concentrated in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), Baluchistan and Punjab. As part of the operations, Pakistan launched air and artillery strikes in remote areas of FATA and Baluchistan as also across the border into Afghanistan, seeking to destroy militant hideouts and simultaneously deported thousands of Afghan refugees, living in the country for decades, on suspicion of being terror supporters. Further, in Punjab the searches targeted mainly those colonies occupied by Pakhtuns or Afghans. Thus, the operation commenced by profiling specific communities as being supporters of terror groups.
The launching of air and artillery strikes and closing border crossings with Afghanistan, has only deteriorated the relationship between the countries. Pak believes that Afghan intelligence agencies, in collusion with Indian RAW are responsible for terror strikes. The Pak army gave a list of over seventy known militants located in Afghanistan to be arrested and handed over. In reply, Afghanistan gave its list of eight-five terrorists on Pak soil. It was just tit for tat. The fact remains that Afghan forces have limited control over remote border areas and are already stretched handling Taliban assaults across the country to respond to Pak’s air and artillery barrages. These strikes only forced Afghan residents living close to the border to flee from their homes, in fear.
The operations supported by firepower would result in collateral casualties to innocents, besides destroying their homes and shelters, further alienating the population. Most operations being conducted in remote areas, claims of success are announced through press releases by ISPR and hence would be one sided. In the first day of operations, ISPR claimed killed over a hundred, which is unlikely. Most of those arrested in the roundups are either Pakhtuns or Afghans.
The profiling of the population and high handedness of the approach would benefit terror groups and increase problems for Pakistan. In Baluchistan, to subdue the independence uprising, Pak employed brutal force, resulting in it losing control of the region. A similar situation may emerge this time. In a report published in an online magazine, Afghan refugees pushed back into Afghanistan have claimed, that since they lack funds for basic survival, they have no option but to join the ISIS for earning revenue. These refugees have lived for decades in Pakistan and are well versed with the topography and security infrastructure. Their joining terror groups would only heighten security problems.
Internal pressure on the country is such that it is compelled to revive military courts to deal with terror suspects. Terror groups which Pakistan once considered as strategic assets, have now splintered and returned to haunt the nation. Both the ISIS and Pakistan Taliban operate along the almost open and inaccessible Pak-Afghan border, where tribal loyalties dominate state control. As pressure increases, they shift deeper into Afghanistan, regroup and await an opportunity to return. Force alone can never eliminate terror groups, as has been proved in every counter terror operation, across the globe. It requires deft political handling alongside application of force. The Pak government’s National Action Plan (NAP) had involved a combination of both. Critics within the country have repeatedly questioned the lack of implementation of the NAP in the conduct of operations, leaving it solely to the army to handle, hence unlikely to succeed.
After decades, India has barely been able to control the militancy in Kashmir, despite following a multipronged approach including trying to win hearts and minds. The Indian army has fought militants at great cost, with hands tied behind their backs, suffering casualties while avoiding damage to civilian property. Expecting the Pak army, adopting a brute force strategy, to succeed is asking for the impossible. The strategy adopted and profiling of the population would only increase support to terror groups and enhance problems for the state. It is repeating mistakes of its earlier operation, Zarb-e-azb, which only brought temporary relief. Probably this operation may soothe population fears, only for some time, before terror groups return with renewed vigour. After all, the army can only sustain force levels deployed in operation Rad-ul-Fasaad for limited durations.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army