Simultaneous India, US pressure could jeopardize Pak ORF 13 Feb 18
Trump’s administration, post his anti-Pak tweet on New Year’s Day, has begun applying pressure on Pak to act against the Taliban and Haqqani network. Hardly a day goes by without comments from a member of his administration conveying in strong terms that it expects Pak to act. Simultaneously, the US has commenced launching drone strikes on Pak soil. The number of strikes is likely to increase. To add to Pak’s woes, the US has officially authorized its military commanders in Afghanistan to target terrorist camps and hideouts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
With an increase in terrorist strikes in Afghanistan, pressure would only increase. The recent attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and ambulance blast had hallmarks of Pak’s direct involvement. The Afghan government conveyed the same to Pak with proof including phone taps involving recent attacks. This added to pressures on Pak.
India, on the other hand is relentless in its actions along the LoC. It continues to respond to Pak’s provocations in full measure. Its surgical strike and other smaller cross border strikes indicate that it is willing to up the ante. It has begun retaliating heavily to Pak’s ceasefire violations. Pak’s denials of the surgical and cross border strikes are indicative of Pak being wary to respond, knowing India may hit back harder. It has however continued to push militants across the border and keeping the LoC active, thus continuing with its policy without respite, banking on its nuclear deterrence.
The Indian army chief, General Bipin Rawat, openly challenged Pak’s so-called nuclear threats, when he stated that if tasked by the government, the army is prepared to cross the border into Pak and call Pak’s nuclear bluff. It compelled Pak to respond with challenges and threats. However, it gave Pak an uncomfortable feeling that India may again seriously consider the ‘cold start’ doctrine, which it has professed and regularly practiced as part of its exercises, but never openly admitted. Thus, it continues to fear Indian counter-strikes.
Within Pak, the army is divided between two frontiers, Eastern and Western. On its Eastern front with India, it does not expect induction of militants, hence maintains a lesser strength, yet Indian response must ensure levels of alertness as also enhanced firepower. It suffers regular casualties due to Indian actions. On its Western front, where there are strikes by the Baluch Freedom Movement fighters and the TTP and the army is involved in battling militancy. It is facing pressure and losses from both directions, yet hides its figures, fearing impact on morale of its forces and the nation. Declaration of casualties would damage its image of invincibility.
Internally Pak remains a divided nation. The control of the military, supported by the judiciary has ensured that no political leader questions the army or its strategic intent. Neither can any party profess peace talks with India or curb the power of the deep state. The strong man, Nawaz Sharif, is out of reckoning and his party heading the government under threat from multiple quarters. This being the election year, there is a likelihood of religious and fundamental parties being a part of the future government. Whoever forms the government will have to toe the military line.
International pressure also continues to mount on Pak to curb supporting terror groups. The next meeting of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is scheduled next month in Paris. India, backed by Russia and the US are expected to make a strong pitch for the world body to compel Pak to step up its fight against terror funding. China would attempt to shield Pak but may not succeed.
Pak thus would try wriggle its way out, seeking a face saving yet safe passage through this mess. An analysis of the situation from Pak’s angle would suggest limited options available to it. It would historically consider India’s strong response along the LoC and conventional military action as it biggest threat, as it has no plans for talking peace with India. Hence, would never consider compromising on its anti-India stance. Thus, anti-India terror groups would continue getting requisite support. Its Kashmir policy, guided by its military would not change anytime soon. The LoC would continue remaining hyper active.
It may delay action against the Taliban and Haqqani network for now, hoping the US considers giving priority to talks with them. It is presently hoping that the US would realize that it needs the support of Pak’s Karachi port and air space and can only push Pak thus far and no further. Hence, it continues to make statements on no bases and promises to act on concrete inputs yet does nothing.
It is fearful of taking on the Taliban and Haqqani network directly for multiple reasons. Firstly, in its view, it would shift the battle in Afghanistan into Pak territory and involve the Pak army, which is already under intense pressure. Secondly, it could lead to them joining hands with anti-Pak groups, the TTP and JuA, making it disastrous for Pak itself. Finally, if it does take them on and eliminates a few leaders and the group is compelled to go in for negotiations, then Pak would never be able to consider Afghanistan as its strategic depth. It would remain ignored by them, even if they become part of the government.
It may be willing to undertake actions against the IS directly and restrict the Taliban and Haqqani network from enhancing its operations, provided the US engages the TTP and its affiliates alongside the Baluchistan Liberation Army. It may even offer to bring the Taliban and Haqqani leadership to the negotiating table. This is possibly Pak’s Afghan policy.
In summary, while it may be willing to negotiate with the US for Afghanistan, it would never compromise on its anti-India policy. By adopting this approach, it may be able to undermine world pressure and enable it to continue with its anti-India stance, which it considers as it biggest threat. Unless its bluff is called, and pressure enhanced, it would take the US and the west for a ride, without changing anything on the ground.
For India, solely mounting pressure along the LoC may bring satisfaction to the troops deployed and the nation but would not curb Pak’s actions. Unless the losses are made visible to the Pak public and escalated to the level that Pak realizes that it is the loser, it would not change. India possesses the firepower and determination to act, ignoring Pak’s threat, hence must be willing to up the ante.
Its counter actions should be such that it adds to Pak’s pressures of its western front. It has been done before and should be repeated. Employment of artillery to strike deep, without considering collateral damage should be the immediate action, alongside diplomatic pressures on Pak to act. Only if cornered on both fronts with equal pressure and increased losses to its forces, would it see sense and possibly respond. Otherwise, the current trend would continue unabated and both India and Afghanistan would witness Pak sponsored violence.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army