Pace the key for interlocutor’s success in Kashmir ORF 27 Oct 17

Pace the key for interlocutor’s success in Kashmir ORF 27 Oct 17

Introduction

The Home Minister, Rajnath Singh, announced the recommencement of the dialogue process in Kashmir, with the appointment of Dineshwar Sharma, the former IB Director, as the centre’s interlocutor. Sharma has been given a free hand to interact with any group or member of society, seeking the aspirations of the people, to enable the centre to move forward with a possible solution. This is a shift from the centre’s earlier policy wherein it had stated that it would not talk to the Hurriyat, whom it considered as anti-nationals and were considered by earlier governments to be the voice of the Kashmiris.

While the step has been welcomed by the BJP’s ruling ally in the state, the PDP, the opposition party in the state, the NC, remains cautious, waiting and watching. The Congress, the main opposition, claimed that the government is finally on the right track, having adopted a failed hard policy for the past few years. Comments have flowed stating that this is only a ploy to further delay the resolution process.

History of channels of dialogue

Sharma is neither the first, nor likely to be the last interlocutor for the central government. KC Pant, a former defence minister and NN Vohra, the present J and K Governor were the first two interlocutors for the centre. They had initiated dialogue with vast sections of society. The UPA-I had appointed five working groups on J and K, including one headed by the former Vice President, Hamid Ansari. These groups had submitted their recommendations to the centre.

The UPA-II had appointed three interlocutors, Dileep Padgaonkar, Radha Kumar and MM Ansari, who had also submitted their report. Manmohan Singh also held a series of round table conferences on J and K. None of the reports of the interlocutors nor working groups ever saw the light of day and majority of their recommendations were never implemented. No official reasons have been given for the same.

Thus, it is evident that while the opposition may criticize, but when they possessed the opportunity, their home ministers only voiced suggestions but failed to take any worthwhile step, while reports of the collection of committees and interlocutors gathered dust. Even previous state governments preferred status quo, as it suited them. Violence and an anti-centre stance kept them in power and power is the end all of politics, the means may vary.

Changing Times

The atmosphere in the valley presently appears to be congenial for arriving at a midway solution, provided the government possesses the desire to push hard, employing resources at its power. Many factors have changed, necessitating a fresh look into issues facing the state, possibly even ignoring earlier reports of interlocutors.

The state is limping back to near normalcy (normalcy is still some distance away), after a prolonged period of unrest. The encounter elimination of Burhan Wani led to sponsored violence, enhanced infiltration and casualties to protestors. The state government had almost handed control of the valley to security agencies. The terrorists appeared to be gaining ground before the army went into operation ‘all out’, reducing their strength in anti-militancy operations, with enhanced anti-infiltration measures.

While terrorist related activities have reduced, the morale of militants is also low, compelling them to attack soft targets including police and local out of power politicians to indicate their presence. This change in trend has begun alienating them from the masses, as is evident from increased flow of information to security agencies. This has enhanced success rate of encounters. This year alone almost 165 militants have been eliminated. The local public away from towns is turning away from militants, seeking closer cooperation with security agencies. Shortage of funds from across the border is compelling militants to target banks, in desperation, to pay its cadres.

The Hurriyat, which appeared to possess no shortage of funds, due to largesse from Pakistan, could orchestrate violence at will. They appeared to be ruling the roost, pushing governments on the backfoot. For decades they were the untouchables, being provided security and funding from the state and centre, with a hope that they would change their spots, which they refused, becoming only more rigid in their demands. Demonetization, NIA and ED raids on hawala funding began impacting their control. Leaked news in every media channel on possession of illegal and benami properties by them and their kin at the cost of casualties to locals, reduced their standing in the public eye.

When they and their kin began being summoned by investigating agencies, their calls for bandhs seeking support were ignored. With most behind bars, others on the way, their power is on the wane. With all funds blocked, there is no money to sponsor violence or even terrorism, hence scales have reduced. They are aware that their crimes have been exposed and they would be tucked away in prison, far from their area of influence.

The NIA and ED raids, subsequent investigations, grilling and incarceration has softened them enough to realize that their days are numbered. With some of them singing like canaries, hoping for a reduced sentence, their top hierarchy has become aware that they are next in line. Hence, probably would try to establish links with the government seeking truce and willing to adopt a softer approach in their otherwise rigid demands.

Who better than an interlocutor, an ex IB director, aware of the Hurriyat and its funding, to whom they can put forward their now softened demands. Publicly the Hurriyat would project a strong stand, they must, or would be considered traitors by the masses, but being aware of pending cases against them and their loss of respect and local standing, would sing a different tune.

This changed environment had never existed in the state in recent times. The Hurriyat only spoke of UN resolutions, the youth of azadi and locals considered the Indian army as occupiers. The Hurriyat is now a spent force, the locals have slowly changed, disgusted with the behaviour and exploitation by militants. While violence by the youth at encounter sites has reduced, their demands for azadi may not have. Hence, Sharma would need to move fast and gain the maximum from interacting with the maximum, to enable the government to strike, while the iron is still hot.

Engaging with the masses

The most important community which needs to be engaged at length is the youth. They were born under the gun, witnessed calls for prayer of only one religion, faced the wrath of security forces, brainwashed into believing that independence is the only solution and have had very limited opportunities to grow beyond stone throwing and countering security forces operations. They desperately need opportunities, preferably away from the state, if they must be weaned away from their brainwashed demands of azadi. Further, it is only by interaction can they be convinced that azadi is not feasible, while other demands benefitting them may be.

Amongst other important groups are those who have suffered the maximum financially in the state, the traders and those dependent on tourism, which was the mainstay of the state. They would need a reassurance that their troubles would be looked into and the centre would work towards resolving their problems. Similar reassurances would be essential for other small handicraft manufacturers, who presently struggle to survive.

Village elders, Kashmiri Pundits, political parties and the Hurriyat would always remain stakeholders in the process and their inputs would be equally important. The centre may consider meeting some demands within the accession document, to establish a positive mood.

Conclusion

Pitfalls in the process are immense. The supreme court is hearing the case against Article 35A, an issue very sentimental to local Kashmiri’s. A decision at this juncture against it, could once again plunge the valley into turmoil. The centre needs to keep this under consideration. Any action by militants or security forces causing large scale casualties could turn this conducive atmosphere on its head.

While the task has magnitude, time remains of essence. Winters are approaching, before which the security agencies seek to eliminate militant leaders, bringing in an environment more conducive to peace and development. It is within this time that Sharma must aim to show the seriousness of the centre.

There is always a doubt in the minds of the locals whether the centre is truly serious, or is it seeking another option to delay decision making. Previous interlocutor’s reports have gathered dust, will this also. The pace at which Sharma moves will indicate the determination of the centre. For now, it is the best step taken.