Towards a solution in Kashmir Bharat Shakti 14 Jul 17
Immense has been written and discussed on the future of Kashmir. There are two broad opinions being projected in social media by those following the current scenario in Kashmir. These can be divided into hard and soft options. The hard option talks of an immediate solution, which includes revoking article 370 (whether it can be, is another issue), creating secure colonies for Kashmiri Pundits and possibly even trifurcation of the state into three parts (again debateable legally on the issue of accession and merger), alongside enhancing military power to ensure the writ of the state is enforced. The soft option implies a steady move towards resolution, including first winning trust and resolving current issues. It avoids measures which could further alienate the population.
The second option implies moving steadily, rather than hastily as in the first, hence would be slow and regular setbacks must be expected. In both cases, enhancing military power to control militancy, giving a free hand to security forces to counter Pak’s aggressive designs and to control levels of violence remain the central theme. Endorsing the second option, its methodology I seek to discuss.
Clear lines are drawn when talks with stake holders are concerned. There is a school of thought which believes that the government must initiate dialogue with the Hurriyat and Pakistan, amongst others. This school is supported by the National Conference (NC) leadership, some elements of the Congress and PDP. Some out of the limelight politicians even rushed to meet the Hurriyat, but like those before them, returned empty handed and shamed. They believe that Pakistan and Hurriyat combined hold the key to the future of peace in J and K and hence are a part of the solution.
The present Modi government has clearly ruled out this school of thought. It firmly believes that talks with Pakistan cannot be conducted under the barrel of a gun, as every time it has taken a step forward, an incident vitiates the atmosphere. Further, unless offer for talks is supported by their army, albeit surreptitiously, it is unlikely to make any headway. The Hurriyat is unwilling to discuss within the gambit of the constitution as also refuses to condemn the violence, hence talks with them are futile. It is known that they are puppets of Pakistan and only have one thought, plebiscite, which is no longer possible. Hence, the government considers both as being a part of the problem. The two schools of thought are thus diametrically opposite. Therefore, a third school of thought needs to emerge.
Again, there are limited avenues for the third school. There is no second rung leadership which has the trust of the locals, mainly the youth, with whom the government could discuss, once it isolates the Hurriyat. The Hurriyat has ensured this. Political parties, including the two main valley ones, NC and PDP, are unwilling to participate, solely fearing political isolation. The youth presently agitating remain unorganized. Only a few thousand participate, holding the state and its population to ransom. Therefore, no single group is openly available for talks. Local militants are incapable of uniting akin to those in the North East, under a single banner, enabling talks. The only option for the centre, if it desires talks, is to create a group of its own comprising of respected elements within society. The difficulty is, nominating those who could influence the population. Presently, no such group appears visible in the near term.
The next aspect which needs to be considered is when does the government initiate dialogue, if any, to resolve the ongoing impasse. If it acts in the present volatile scenario, it could convey a message that it is initiating action solely because the Kashmir valley is slipping from its hands. Alternatively, it could wait for a semblance of near normalcy (complete normalcy is unlikely in the near future), then its actions could be considered being undertaken from a position of strength. This approach had succeeded in creating peace in other militancy affected areas in the North East and Punjab, where the army created conditions of near normalcy, forcing militant groups onto the defensive, permitting the government to initiate dialogue. In every case the government was patient and awaited the right opportunity, however, in a modern communication driven world, where social media rules, such patience may not be feasible, hence the government may be rushed.
Pakistan is aware of the options open to the Indian government and has therefore created an unending supply of cannon fodder militants aiming to thwart these options. Its funding of the violence through the Hurriyat and pushing in militants, irrespective of failures and losses is solely aimed at denying the Indian army from gaining the upper hand. The deep state, comprising the Pak army and the ISI, is firm in its belief that their ultimate aim of wresting Kashmir would succeed employing their present approach, hence refuse to permit their own government from initiating dialogue. Thus, for the Indian government a stalemate remains on its plans for moving ahead, an action which suits the deep state as the Indian army continues to remain embroiled in Kashmir.
Thus, the government adopted an offensive policy for handling the present situation. It has permitted the army to enhance its offensive actions along the Line of Control (LoC), while inducting additional forces for counter infiltration and counter militancy operations. The intention is to make it costly for Pakistan in terms of destruction of defences, resulting in increased vulnerability in the long term, human costs and damage to its internal standing and reputation. Simultaneously the police and CRPF have been given leeway to control stone throwers, while the NIA has been unleashed to control funding and isolate the Hurriyat. This in nutshell appears to be the first phase of the government’s strategy.
With no suitable groups to initiate dialogue, the only option available is the announcement one, wherein the government unilaterally announces its initial suggestions, seeking views and talks with anyone willing to participate. This again is fraught with risks, as its offer could be twisted and exploited by opposition parties and anti-national elements. Hence the governments, both at the centre and the state are stalemated in their future course. An out of the box option could be tying the Hurriyat into such legal tangles and threatened with criminal actions to a level that they may be compelled to agree to a dialogue.
Before initiating any action, there are some pre-requisites which would need to be fulfilled. These include creating a conducive environment by reducing the numbers of infiltrated and local militants, containing localized violence and isolation of the Hurriyat. Secondly, is perception management. This needs to be handled at the state and national levels. At the national level, all television discussions stereotype Kashmiri’s as anti-nationals, whereas the fact is that a few thousand, unemployed and misguided youth, hold the state to ransom. Channels should be advised to select common youth, seeking a brighter future and a peaceful environment to share their views, rather than always selecting the same anti-national activists.
Simultaneously at the state level, activities which involve the youth should be enhanced. The army has proved time and again that sporting events have been great successes, even in troubled times in the valley, and witnessed wide participation while enhancing bonding, hence need to be increased manifold. The presence of thousands of youth despite calls for boycott at recruitment rallies for the army and police indicates desperation for a better life, sans violence. Hence enhancing employment opportunities is essential.
What can the government offer, which could be acceptable by the mass, barring the pro-Pak Hurriyat and a few thousand misguided local militants and their supporters. Offers for development have regularly been made, funds pumped in, but corruption and bad governance has ensured that the local Kashmiri is denied benefits. Not much has changed in rural areas. The government cannot offer plebiscite nor freedom, however can initiate action to build confidence and allay fears which exist in local minds.
J and K is the only state which acceded but did not merge, implying it has maintained its pre-independence boundaries (while those of other states have been regularly altered as per national requirements), has its original flag and constitution. Hence local fears emerge from losing this identity. Another fear is that a Hindu majority government at the centre, in coalition with the PDP may attempt to change demography and engulf a Muslim majority Kashmir. This fear was propagated by the NC and the Hurriyat, based on the assumption that the government was seeking to create secure colonies for Kashmiri Pundits and ex-servicemen. Rumour mongering only added fuel to fire on these issues. The government’s both at the centre and the state had to clarify, in parliament and state assembly, that there is no such intention. Thus, the government should first dispel such fear in open statements.
Secondly, the government needs to revisit the autonomy issue, mainly based on the terms of merger of the state. By granting autonomy in areas, which do not affect national decision making, to the state, it could recreate confidence that there are no plans afoot to disturb the status quo. Once these issues are addressed, confidence restored, then the government may move ahead with offers for development. Amongst the first actions in development is enhancing civic facilities including power generation, employment enhancement and better educational facilities. Providing corruption free governance, with visibility of government representatives would go a long way in restoring confidence. Simultaneously the state government must initiate talks with student bodies of colleges to understand grievances and seek remedies.
The move towards a solution may sound systematic; however, every step is fraught with pitfalls and roadblocks. Movement ahead must be in stages, one step at a time. Pak would continue to thwart its attempts, dislodge the process, but perseverance and diligence would ultimately pay. Confidence, building trust and good governance must move hand in hand. The role of the state government is key. It must seek to create a second rung of leadership, acceptable to the youth, with whom discussions can progress, with passage of time. Sole announcements from the podium, without a support base of leaders to convince the masses may also witness failure.
We need to remember that no problem was resolved overnight, The Naga insurgency is still being resolved. Here, with active interference by Pakistan, it may take longer. Sole military force has never been the answer, it has always been resolution by political means, the army only creating the environment. The nation needs to realize that all Kashmiri’s are not anti-India, but those who are, dominate headlines. Patience is the key, however unless initiation begins, a stalemate would continue. There is a light at the end of the tunnel, however, reaching it needs careful negotiation.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army