Impact of changed strategy in Kashmir The Excelsior 30 Jun 17
I had written in this column some time ago on the new strategy being implemented by the government for Kashmir. This strategy had a few basic elements. They included hard response to Pakistan along the LoC for attempted transgressions, multiple layered deployment for thwarting infiltration attempts, increased operations against terrorists operating in the valley, additional powers to police forces to control stone throwers and those interrupting army operations and releasing the NIA to curb hawala funding ultimately seeking to isolate the separatists.
The strategy involved all security agencies working hand in glove, to thwart designs of Pak and their Indian proxies. The strategy is witnessing success on ground, slowly paving the way for the government to move to its final stage of isolating separatists. It has placed Pak proxies including separatists in Kashmir on the defensive, compelling them to change their methodology, which too appears to be backfiring.
The offensive approach of the army has proved effective. They have successfully eliminated over seventy militants in approximately forty days and have a list of the balance, who can now only await their deaths. However, time is of essence. The Amaranth Yatra is scheduled to commence soon, before which major successes are essential thus pushing militants onto the back foot and into remote areas. The elimination of militants near the LoC are hampering Pak designs as they suffer losses at the entry stage itself. They would now be revisiting their infiltration routes and tactics, hence seeking alternate options. Strong retaliation is pushing them onto the defensive as they struggle to hide true casualty figures.
Contrary to earlier beliefs of more locals joining militant ranks in case of elimination of existing militants, is the fact that faster elimination of local militants, would deter fresh entrants as they would realize that picking the gun would considerably reduce life spans, an action few are willing to risk, after all life is precious, irrespective of sermons of religious zealots. The army’s success is also adversely affecting morale of local militants, who earlier felt they could gain the upper hand, but now solely resort to fire and run, fearing elimination.
However, realizing that the movement is slowly losing steam and impacting the morale of those who voluntarily participate in stone throwing and seek to hamper anti-militant operations, the local militants and the Hurriyat are compelled to change tack. They have now commenced targeting the local police, their own brethren and kith and kin, breaking the bond, which existed throughout troubled times in the valley. This year alone seventeen policemen have been martyred in the valley, a fairly high figure. It is a far cry of desperation from their earlier demands of asking policemen to leave the force.
The J and K police is an important element in anti-militancy operations. Inputs on movement of terrorists and possible routes in and out, flow from them. They are aware of details of families of each local militant and have the wherewithal to harass them to levels which could force hiding militants into committing errors, leading to faster elimination. They also have the onerous task of controlling stone throwers and those attempting to disrupt anti-militant operations. They have held their calm and handled their task with aplomb. However, regular targeting of police personnel could result in the police seeking revenge.
The ambush on a police team led by SHO Feroz Ahmed and the lynching of DSP Ayub Pandith in the vicinity of the Jama Masjid in Srinagar in recent times, could be the turning point. The patience of the police is wearing thin, locals from the villages and localities of the martyred policemen are changing their opinion on the struggle. They have commenced supporting the state, rather than those that target their own.
Kashmiriyat may return slowly in remote areas, spreading across cities with time, as desperation creeps into the movement and errors are committed. The police which remained silent on stone throwers and ring leaders would now commence cracking the whip. The police frustration reached a peak, compelling the DGP to comment that the time is now ripe for the security of the Hurriyat to be withdrawn.
The central government remains silent, biding its time, knowing the situation is slowly turning in its favour, creating the environment it seeks for resolution. The claim by the ISIS faction led by Zakir Musa, that it provided information leading to the elimination of six militants, is opening the rift between various groups. Pak would be compelled to direct its proxies within Kashmir to target Musa and his group, opening doors for an internal battle, enabling the security forces to commence gaining the upper hand.
The scene is being set for the climax, the final stage involving the arrest and relocation of the Hurriyat. Demands for removing their security cover is on the rise. The government possibly fears, that removing their security would make them vulnerable to being assassinated, resulting in increased violence. This may not be the case, as they are marked targets for the group headed by Musa, and being killed by their own brethren would have no major impact in the valley and even if it does, it would be temporary.
Most importantly, the valley has no second rung leadership which could even take over and guide the struggle, post the isolation and removal of the Hurriyat. Hence the intensity of the struggle may surge for a few days, however would soon wane, with no one to guide or pay those agitating. If it reoccurs, it would be uncoordinated and irregular. With a slow-down of hawala funds, it would become unsustainable in the long term. However, if the government dilly dallies and delays in taking advantage of the changing scenario, it may miss the bus.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army