Imran’s nuclear threats are irrelevant The Excelsior 25 Sep 19
Imran’s nuclear threats are irrelevant 25 Sep 19
Imran’s nuclear threat is the end of a spectrum of approaches taken by his government post the abrogation of article 370. When every approach and strategy failed, Pakistan was forced to adopt the possibility of a nuclear threat. An analysis of the strategic approaches which Pak adopted to arrive at this step and its reasons need to be understood.
Since the abrogation of Article 370, Imran and his ministers have been ranting across the globe, in every forum and to every media channel, which seeks to interact with them. It appears that the announcement by Amit Shah on the morning of 05 Aug had shell shocked them, though they were aware that something was amiss, especially with additional troop deployment and the sudden cancellation of the Amarnath Yatra. It broke the very premise for their survival as a nation state.
This was the final nail in the coffin of a failed Imran Khan government. Since he came to power the Pak economy was only going downhill, forcing him to approach every ally and international funding agency for loans. Unemployment was rising and inflation was hitting the roof. Internally, there was trouble in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Waziristan and Baluchistan. In most of these areas, security forces were facing losses. Along the LoC, Indian retaliation had begun to hurt, and Pak defences were being targeted and losses increasing.
The announcement by Amit Shah only added to public anger as the carefully built narrative of seventy years of ‘Kashmir banega Pakistan’ had suddenly crumbled. The Pak army, the defender of the country, responsible to grab Kashmir from India, was suddenly powerless. It had in the last few decades switched its role from professionalism in operations to enhancing its business enterprises. Security and managing threats had been outsourced to friendly Jihadi outfits. The army was almost certain that with a nuclear weapon stockpile, military operations are a thing of the past. It had no solution, other than employing its Jihadist power.
The Pakistan leadership, military and puppet government, were forced to respond. Imran became the spokesperson of the ruling Junta. There were limited options, with a military option being clearly ruled out. It chose diplomacy and began screaming of India changing the established narrative. It conveyed to every nation and international body that India was twisting UN resolutions and intending to change demography in the valley. Such was the standing and reputation of Pak, that apart from China, it received no support. Even the OIC and its main constituents, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, traditional Pak supporters, ignored them.
Failing on this front and desperate to regain ground, Imran and his team changed tack. They switched to two aspects which impact the western world the most. Human Rights and Nuclear war. They began accusing India of a clampdown in Kashmir and curbing of human rights of the local population. The fact that curfew had generally been lifted and only internet and mobile connectivity remained affected was of limited consequence.
Human Rights was projected by Pak in multiple forums across the globe but again there was no pressure on India, nor any discussion or resolution. Human Rights, is anyway, an issue which every nation has heard and acted on only what suits its national interests. Resolutions on it are never binding.
Pak was certain that Kashmir would boil to levels beyond those post the encounter killing of Burhan Wani, where similar curbs existed for three months, yet violence continued unabated, leading to over seventy dead and thousands, including security force personnel, injured. That time, satisfied with the level of violence, there were no calls for lifting curbs on communications.
Without violence in Kashmir, the Pak agenda was losing ground. Its ISPR had prepared a collection of fake video’s ready to be pushed into Kashmir to ignite violence, but with a communication lockdown, it was hampered. Thus, calls for opening communication channels were raised across the globe.
Further, Pak had failed to gauge the level of preparation the Indian government had done. It had, prior to abrogating the article, side lined the Hurriyat, detained political leaders who had exploited the system and locked in maximum over ground workers. With no resources to fund violence and no entity to incite violence, incidents remained localised and of very low intensity.
Thus, Pak was forced to again change strategy. If it continued to be ignored, internal pressures would build against the leadership. Such pressures could even threaten the power and domination of the army. Imran and his government may be indispensable, but the power of the army cannot be challenged. This led to the final and riskiest step of the Pakistan plan. It was to push in terrorists for a strike within India.
The terrorists were given a few specific tasks. They were initially tasked to only attack local civilians to ensure that curfew like restrictions continue and the world is conveyed that Indian clampdown exists. If this fails, then they would be tasked to target Indian security forces. A major attack on security forces may be possible after October, once the FATF meeting concludes.
Pak is aware that such a step is fraught with danger. Any major incident prior to the FATF meeting could imply building pressure to blacklist Pak. Pak has possibly secured the minimum three votes essential to avoid being downgraded and would request for additional time to complete FATF formalities. This is one of the agendas of Imran in New York. Even more risky was that if a terror strike led to large casualties, Indian response would be hard and strong and in an area which Pak may not be able to hide from its public.
In such a case, Pak would be compelled to respond, to display to its public that they are capable of challenging Indian military power. It is fear of failure in responding in equal measure which Imran sought to project when he raised the bogey on multiple occasions of a nuclear war. Pakistan was able to hide from its public the impact of the initial surgical strike and Balakote strikes, but may not be able to do so again, as the Indian response could well be in a public area.
The reasons for Imran adopting this approach are multiple and need assessment. Imran is aware that the western public possesses an anathema to nuclear war and hence hoped to project the volatility of the Kashmir region in the subcontinent. He is aware that a successful terrorist strike could escalate tensions and hopes pressure on India could offset Indian retaliation. With no Indian response, internal pressures on him would reduce. This was the reason why he wrote on the subject in the New York Times and has been regularly harping on ‘accidental war’ and ‘nuclear war’ in the region.
Secondly, he aims to convey a warning to India that Pak would employ nuclear weapons in case its existence is threatened. India may respond to any Pak misadventure but keep its response below nuclear threshold. Thirdly, he is conveying that the Pak armed forces lack the power for a conventional war and hence the only option is a nuclear threat.
Fourthly, by claiming an Indian military threat, the army can easily subdue internal political pressures, which it has begun doing. Finally, with the UN General Assembly session in progress, talking of a nuclear war in the subcontinent could project a positive image of Pak as a nation concerned about India’s misadventures in Kashmir and its peaceful intent.
India has no intention to break the entity of Pak. Threats of grabbing POK are only to enhance pressures on Pak and satisfy domestic audiences within the country. India is aware of the limits to any counter which it may undertake in case Pak plans a major misadventure. It is also aware of the dire straits Pak is in and the growing desperation within. Hence, it has ignored Imran’s rantings.
A nuclear threat from Pak indicates the absurdity of an educated Prime Minister. It also displays the fear within the ruling establishment. No responsible nuclear power ever talks of a nuclear strike, nor can it ever be launched without world support. The slightest attempt to prepare nuclear weapons for a strike, could signal the end of the country, as world powers would be forced to step in.
Thus, the nuclear warmongering by Imran is clearly a sign of desperation. With the world losing interest in Kashmir, as Iran-Saudi tensions and rising global oil prices grab limelight, Imran must create an environment to pull it back into international centre stage. This can only happen if there is a spurt of violence in Kashmir or an incident pushes India to respond with force. This is unlikely unless there is a terror strike.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army