Joint planning centre vs theatre commands: Who should lead in war ETv Bharat 03 Sep 2025
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Joint planning centre vs theatre commands: Who should lead in war ETv Bharat 03 Sep 2025
Speaking at a fireside chat in Mhow, as part of ‘Ran Samwad 2025, the air chief, Air Marshal AP Singh mentioned, ‘I feel having joint planning and coordination at the apex level is what is required. If directions go from it, things will work out. We don’t actually need another structure at the lower level (implying theatre commands).’ He added, ‘disrupting everything and making one structure (theatre commands) now at this time, I do not think it is a very good idea.’
The air force proved its primacy in Operation Sindoor, a limited operation. It played a major role in subduing Pakistan’s air power as also degrading its strategic assets, compelling it to approach New Delhi for a ceasefire. The air force, due to paucity of resources, has always believed that they cannot divide limited air assets to theatre commands and these must remain under centralized control. It believes it may not be able to employ them as at present due to blocks placed by theatre commanders.
Under the system being proposed by the air chief, HQ IDS (Integrated Defence Staff) would establish a joint planning and coordination centre which would include the three service chiefs working in unison under the CDS. They would determine force levels to be employed and operate jointly to achieve common goals. This would enable air HQ to determine the type of aircraft it needs as also ammunition essential to meet laid down goals.
Such a construct and levels of coordination would be dependent upon understanding between service chiefs and the CDS. This may be ideal at present but was not the same during the tenure of General Bipin Rawat, a fact well known, needing no further elaboration. Hence, there is a possibility of the system being off-tracked due to differences in perceptions and individual views.
Operation Sindoor was launched two weeks post Pahalgam. This gave Pakistan time to deploy its resources as it expected an Indian assault, indications to which were made by political leaders. The surprise was in the manner India responded. The initial Indian response was partially flawed as it did not subdue Pakistan’s air defences while targeting its terrorist camps. However, the subsequent assault, post subduing its air defences, proved to be fatal for Pakistan.
The gap between Pahalgam and Operation Sindoor was utilized to gather information about Pak camps, formulate plans for a counteroffensive as also prepare the strikes. This was because service HQs had not envisaged such a contingency. The entire system put in place was ad-hoc but successful for a short operation, needing close monitoring. Its effectiveness was also due to the involvement of multiple intelligence and technical agencies, largely headed by the NSA, whose inputs proved decisive.
A theatre command on the other hand should have representatives of all these agencies as part of it, if its structure is correctly planned. The western theatre command, responsible for the Pak front would always have options to counter any misadventure. It is unlikely that it would take over a fortnight to react to such an incident. The faster the reaction, the more the impact and firmer the message. At the same time, such operations would need clearance from Joint Chief’s of Staff on its implementation, post political sanction.
Secondly, would a similar coordination centre be as effective in war, which is the primary role of the armed forces, unlike a single service led short operation, with army operations laregly restricted to a single sector. War would not involve just air power but coordinated employment of all forces, including strike formations of the army, all of which were missing this time.
These cannot be controlled from New Delhi, where service HQs are located, apart from generalized directions. Operations are coordinated at Command levels and executed at Corps and below, based on a national objective and end state. No two service command HQs are co-located for effective and joint planning. In the current construct, the army cannot even bank on guaranteed air power resources in its operational plans as these are controlled from New Delhi and dependent on the air force’s strategic and operational plans.
The best structure in such a scenario would be theatre commands. Operation Sindoor is not the new normal on which all future operations including a prolonged war would be based. As Rajnath Singh stated at the same event, ‘In today’s era, it is very difficult to predict when a war will end.’ He added that it could stretch from months to years.
Thirdly, why is the air HQ unwilling to accept theatre commands. Does it believe that the theatre commander would hesitate to share resources? If so, then this is farfetched. Theatre commanders also operate under the CDS and joint chiefs of staff and hence would implement all directions.
Retaliatory actions, as in Operation Sindoor, with limited aims and objectives are vastly different and could be coordinated in the manner it was. Further, the next response by India to a Pak misadventure may not be a repeat of Operation Sindoor. Structures proposed by the air chief may then be unsuitable.
Another regular occurrence necessitating retaliatory actions are intrusions in the northern sector. The current approach is to stall the intrusion and enter into discussion. The Indian armed forces would need to consider similar countermeasures by own forces in adjoining sectors speeding dialogue leading to resolution. While such operations would be army led, movement of additional forces from the interior would need air power. Air power would also be needed in case of escalation. This would best be controlled by theatre commands as they would be responsible for the entire front.
As the air chief rightly mentioned, emphasis needs to also be given cyber, space, AI and electronic warfare. These organizations will all be part of theatre commands and far more closely integrated, rather than at the levels of service HQs.
It was also stated by the air chief that theatre commands are a western concept and should not be aped. While the term may be western, the commands are being structured to Indian needs. The current structure of the armed forces, including most terminology, traditions and customs, are also copied from the British with few modifications, flowing from lessons and changing concepts of war. Similarly, theatre commands need to be tailor-made to meet Indian threats. If needed, a new terminology could also be coined.
The fact is that strategic and operational plans encompassing all three services, harnessing their core strengths to achieve national objectives is paramount. This can only be through theatre commands rather than centralized control. If centralized control was the answer, then why does the air force have seven commands? Air HQs should be sufficient. It is time the armed forces set aside their personal differences for the national good.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army
THEARTRICS 04 Mar 2027, 0915 hrs
The roads leading to the new PMO are brimming with vehicles awaiting their turn to enter the premises. After last night’s terrorist attack on one of the busiest commercial complexes in the western state of India, for which the self-proclaimed Field Marshal and martial law administrator of Pakistan has denied any involvement, the cabinet has been summoned for deciding the riposte. “We should strike at the heart of the country” was the consensus emerging. “Call the service chiefs and the CDS”, said the PM.
0945Hrs The CDS and three service chiefs are ushered into the cabinet room. After
a brief update by the Cab Secy, the men in uniform are asked their opinion on a retaliatory strike. “Let me speak with the Western Theatre commander”, said the CDS and added, “If you permit, I will get him online”. After getting the nod, a call was put through to Jaipur, but the WTC commander was in Bhopal, observing a table top exercise. He was hurriedly brought online, taken by complete surprise with the call. “General, what are your contingency plans for striking abc and xyz?” the CDS asked. “Can you be brief and clear for the honourable cabinet members?” “Jai Hind sirs, actually we have two or three different options, based on the time available. If we can strike him after 40-45 days, I will be able to mobilize a large part of the army and we can execute our planned retaliatory strategy”. “Tell us what you can do before the weekend”, yelled the RM.“Please allow me to consult my air component commander. I will revert
with the options within the hour”.
“You have 15 minutes”, said the CDS.
“Why don’t you brief us on the options, chief?” the NSA addressed the
CAS.
The CAS sheepishly replied, “sir as you are aware, the operational control
over the air assets is with the Theatre Commanders. My role is to provide
them with trained manpower and the wherewithal to fight.”
In the meanwhile, the cabinet was briefed by the intelligence agencies and
the foreign secretary on the global reactions to the distressing attack.
The tele-presence screen came on again with the WTC commander in
sharp focus.
“What do you have for us?” asked the CDS.
“Sir, the air component commander has assured that we can strike both
abc and xyz by first light tomorrow. But he will require at least four
squadrons of fighters from the ETC immediately to be able to defend
against any counter strikes launched by the enemy. All AEW&C aircraft,
tankers and fighters will have to be moved from ETC to WTC. The COSC
committee would need to decide on how much to leave behind in the ETC
AOR for any contingency,” the WTC commander announced with an air of
confidence.
“How about using the naval air assets?” asked the defence secretary.
“I will check with the Maritime Theatre commander sir,” said the WTCC.
“CNS, can you inform the committee as to how naval air assets can
supplement the effort?” asked the NSA.
“Sir, I have only a dozen fighters directly under me. They are the ones
from the training squadrons that report to me. The MTC commander can
provide the necessary support, but I have been told that the carrier is out
on exercise on the eastern seaboard and can be ready for ops after three
days.”
“What are your plans to cut off the enemy from receiving reinforcements
from the sea?” asked the EAM to the WTCC.“Sir, for that I will need to speak to the MTC Commander.” Replied the
WTCC.
The PM was fuming by now. He looked sternly at the CDS and service
chiefs and said, “what are you doing here, if all decisions are being taken
by someone else?”
The COAS mustered courage and said, “sir, as was decided, the role of
the service chiefs is to raise, train and sustain the forces. We have no
operational role or control over our forces”.
“Who is the single person that has the clear overall picture of the action
we need to take?” asked the NSA.
“Sir, the shared responsibility for planning and executing any operations
against our western neighbour rests with WTCC and MTCC. They will
present their plans to the COSC who will approve it for execution’, replied
the CDS.
“On what basis will the COSC take any decision, if the chiefs have been
busy recruiting, training and maintaining the equipment?” thundered the
NSA.
“Sir, they have under them some elements of ops staff who keep them
updated on exercises and actions being conducted by the theatre
commands”, said the CDS.
Patience was running low across the room.
“I want a clear plan by 1200”, said the PM and got up to leave the room.
The CDS went into a huddle with the RM, pleading for more time.
“Sir, the MTCC has to fly in from Thiruvananthapuram; it will take him at
least six hours to reach here. Can you seek more time from the PM?”
“No!” replied the RM. “We have to present our options to the cabinet at
the appointed hour.”
The chiefs looked at each other with a sense of helplessness. The CNS
had just returned from a week-long tour of dockyards and armament
depots. The CAS had a meeting planned with the C-in-Cs of Training and
Maintenance commands, who reported directly to him. The COAS was to
leave for the southern states to witness recruitment rallies. They decidedto quickly assume command over their forces if the TCs could not make it
for the next meeting.
“But that is tantamount to rolling back the reforms that we have succeeded
in implementing after so may years”, said the CDS who vetoed any such
action.
1200Hrs
The CDS flashed some slides of planned options, that were sent across
by the ops staff of the TCs, while the commanders themselves were at
35000 feet, flying in to the capital.
“This is insane”, remarked a senior member of the cabinet. “We want to
hear about one consolidated plan, not two plans made by two theatre
commanders”.
“What about the non-kinetic means of striking the enemy?” enquired
another minister.
“That will be addressed by agencies that are directly under my command’,
replied the CDS.
“But shouldn’t their plans be synchronized with the offensive action?”
asked the minister.
“Sir, per our new construct, the WTCC and MTCC make their plans for
kinetic actions and request the JFHQ to dovetail the cyber and space
action plans.” Said the CDS, wondering why it was so difficult to
understand.
“So, who coordinates and monitors all the action that is being taken by the
lower formations and the progress of the battle?” the minister asked.
“Sir, the maritime battle is controlled by the MTCC, the land battle by the
WTCC and the air assets are dynamically allotted to them, based on their
respective plans”, answered the CDS.
“How is it better than the older system?” the minister fumed.
“The service chiefs have shed their operational responsibility, which gives
them more mind space for recruitment and training, which is a 24/7, 365-day activity during peacetime. The TCs, who are out there in the field have more time to plan their operations. It’s a win-win situation, sir,” said the CDS.
1230Hrs.
The meeting is adjourned. No decision could be taken in the absence of the theatre commanders. The EAM and FM are briefed to commence actions as already planned by their ministries. Information warfare, economic and diplomatic measures are to be taken with immediate effect.
The following week, multiple meetings are held by the CDS with the theatre commanders. With increased air activity in the eastern sector, the ETCC was unwilling to allow his assets to move out of his AOR. PAF continued to increase flying activity all along the western front. The MTCC decided to move the CBG to the straits of Hormuz, because going by OpSindoor, moving the combatant ships out of harbour caused the Pakis to wave the white flag.
Meanwhile the Paki CAS got promoted to Marshal of the Air Force.
De Bunker Buster