Armed forces must adapt to tackle future battles The Statesman 26 May 2026
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Armed forces must adapt to tackle future battles The Statesman 26 May 2026
Recent conflicts have two distinct characteristics. The first is war between neighbouring countries primarily with territorial disputes while the second is when a state or alliance, without a common border with the adversary, seeks to force it into submission or accept its terms. The Azerbaijan-Armenia war of 2020 and 2023 and the Russo-Ukraine conflict, into its fifth year, fall in the first, while the US-Israel-Iran war come in the second. India has territorial disputes with both its adversaries and any conflict with either would come in the first category.
Wars in recent times have been influenced by technological changes, including AI. In the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, rockets, drones, missiles, EW and loitering ammunition were successfully employed for the first time. Armenia accepted a ceasefire because its forces were severely depleted in coordinated strikes by Azerbaijan utilizing Turkish UAVs and loitering ammunition.
Technology has dominated the Russo-Ukraine conflict in far more imaginative ways. Russia was successful in the initial stages as Ukraine had yet to develop its UAV and counter UAV capabilities. As war progressed, imaginative use of UAVs and commercial satellites made the battlefield transparent, while inclusion of armed robots and UAVs alongside missiles, added to destruction. Surprise was no longer possible nor is deployment and employment of large-scale mechanized forces.
As lessons emerged, Russian mechanized forces began being equipped with counter drone and loitering munition capabilities, while their tactics also changed. Capture of territory remains the primary intent; hence troops are deployed to gain or deny the same, despite challenges. Currently, progress is slow and frontlines are largely frozen.
There are no longer large mechanized forces bunched together breaking through, but smaller teams backed by firepower and UAVs. Ukraine has realized that despite its vast exploitation of UAVs and armed robots (to make up for shortfalls in troops), without boots on the ground they cannot stop Russian advance. Land forces remain essential in conflicts involving territorial disputes.
Use of airpower has also changed. The Russian air force, far superior to Ukraine’s, changed its philosophy of operational employment, once it encountered multi-layered Ukrainian air defences, resulting in heavy losses. It began avoiding contested air spaces to prevent attrition and instead relied on its accurate long-range weapons, including cruise missiles and glide bombs, releasing them beyond range of Ukraine’s air defences.
This also affected close air support traditionally provided to ground forces in contact battle. Ground troops have to be self-reliant in defence as air support is only available from a distance. To target Ukraine’s industrial complexes, energy infrastructure and re-supply depots, Russia utilizes UAVs and missiles, fired from deep within. Ukraine’s ability to hit Russian airbases have forced Moscow to move its air power resources further back.
Troops on the frontlines are dependent on FPV (First Person View) drones and loitering munitions. These are utilized to monitor movements of the adversary as also target advancing troops. UAVs and ground drones are employed for re-supply and casualty evacuation. Drones are now modified with anti-jamming capabilities and anti-drone nets are common over defensive positions.
Iran is a different kettle of fish and the war here cannot be compared to Ukraine. Neither the US nor Israel share a common border with Iran and hence operations are based on US-Israel air power and Iran’s missile and drone power.
India’s Operation Sindoor largely followed the Russo-Ukraine model. With Pakistan possessing Chinese air defence systems, Indian air power exploited their long-range weapon systems as also loitering ammunition alongside Brahmos missiles fired from well within own side, targeting Pakistan’s air defence systems and military bases. India’s S400 anti-aircraft missile system achieved a record-breaking surface to air kill of Pakistan’s Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft at a distance of 314 Kms.
Air defences on both sides ensured air power stayed well within own territory to avoid being targeted. This scenario will only get more complex in the future. Employment of air power close to the border or in enemy territory can only happen once air defence systems of the adversary are negated which is unlikely in short conflicts. Air operations in Sindoor were different from Operation Bandar in 2019, targeting Balakote, where a dog fight resulted in air losses to both Pak and India.
Simultaneously Indian artillery fired precession guided ammunition to degrade Pakistan’s terrorist camps and posts, which had supported movement of terrorists. The Indian army, has since Sindoor, gone in for induction of UAVs and loitering munitions from battalion level upwards to enhance staying power of troops on the ground. It is also restructuring its firepower by inducting long range weapons with precision targeting.
The raising of Rudra brigades and Integrated Battle Groups is to offset presenting large mechanized forces. There are also reports of the army raising a rocket and missile force for targeting positions in depth as also defending own troops in the contact battle. The artillery has adopted fire and scoot tactics to avoid being engaged by the adversary’s loitering munitions and counter-bombardment.
The air force is simultaneously enhancing its long-range strike capabilities. The ongoing/ planned induction of Rampage, Brahmos, and Crystal Maze missiles for air to ground targets, Gaurav, TARA glide bombs and SAAW (Smart Anti-Airfield Weapons) for enemy’s strategic installations and Meteor, Astra Mk II, etc for long-range air to air combat, apart from loitering munitions and smart drones, indicate that engagement in future conflicts would be from beyond range of the adversary’s air defence systems.
Future airspace would be contested, dominated by air defence systems, preventing traditional employment of air power. This also implies that close air support for the army, once contact battle commences, would flow from a distance exploiting accurate air to ground weapon systems. Hence, troops on the ground must possess the ability to identify threats as also defend themselves with UAVs and loitering ammunition directly under their control alongside dedicated artillery and missile power.
The airspace over the TBA (Tactical Battle Area) would be congested, being simultaneously utilized by multiple forces. Expecting airspace to be coordinated by a single agency, except by altitude, or UAVs being controlled by a specific service or command for better coordination of the airspace, will not be feasible in the future battlefield. Adding to confusion would be intense EW actions aiming to disrupt command, control and communications. We need to find realistic solutions to manage the airspace if we are to fight the next war jointly.
About the Author
Maj Gen Harsha Kakkar
Retired Major General Indian Army